The reserve cannot be rugged

On the explorer you will see one address holding 250,000,000 OSR, a quarter of the supply. It is not a wallet. It is OSRClaimDistributor, the contract that pays reward claims. The game promised about 228.6M OSR of lifetime emissions and OSR has no mint function, so every token that will ever reach a player had to be bought up front and parked in the contract that pays it out. What matters is not the size of that holding. It is whether anyone can move it.

The reserve was bought in the public launch dev buy and deposited in a single transfer from the launch wallet to the distributor (tx 0xe7a42080b8e42ce5f82e45c2c266e3a2fe99fb9c994b52005443b51fc7951603). Nobody minted it and nobody can mint more.

1. There is exactly one way out, and it goes to players. The distributor has one function that transfers OSR: payout(). It can only be called by the PAYOUT_ROLE key, pays each claim at most once, and is bounded by a rolling 24-hour cap of 25,000,000 OSR. A separate PAUSER_ROLE key can freeze it instantly. The contract is not upgradeable: no proxy, no delegatecall, token address fixed in the constructor.

2. The escape hatch has been made permanently unreachable. The distributor has an emergency sweep behind a 7-day timelock. The only role that can reach it, DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, is held by no person. It is held by a second contract, OsrDistributorGuardian, whose code contains no function that calls the sweep, no cap raise, and no generic grantRole. Not restricted: absent. The guardian can only rotate the payout and pauser keys, unpause, and lower the cap. The deployer renounced admin in the deploy transaction.

3. We did not throw the key away, on purpose. Renouncing admin outright would also destroy the ability to revoke a leaked payout key or to unpause. That swaps a rug risk for a bricking risk. The guardian keeps exactly the powers that protect you and none that could hurt you.

Being specific about the limits is part of being trustworthy. A compromised payout key, or the team, since the guardian owner can grant that role, can pay out at most 25,000,000 OSR per rolling day, in public Payout events. Emptying the reserve that way would take ten uninterrupted days in plain sight, during which the pauser freezes it and the guardian revokes the key. That is a bound, not zero, and it shrinks: emissions halve every 7 days and the cap can only be lowered, so it is lowered as the schedule falls.

Tokens outside the reserve are not covered. The launch wallet below holds about 22,000,000OSR (2.2%), the remainder of the launch buy, kept as the operator’s float. It is the only OSR a person can move, and it is disclosed here so nobody has to guess.

Bugs are not impossible either. Because the sweep is unreachable, a bug that locks funds cannot be rescued. We accepted that on purpose: an escape hatch that can save you is also an escape hatch that can rob you.

1. Read the holding. balanceOf(distributor) on the token: the 25%.
2. Confirm no person is admin. On the distributor, scan RoleGranted / RoleRevoked for role 0x00…00. The only address still holding it must be the guardian. Use the event history, not a single hasRole() call.
3. Read the guardian. It has bytecode and the verified source has no sweep function. It is short enough to read in a few minutes.
4. Confirm the cap. dailyCap() on the distributor is the most that can leave in any 24 hours. It can be lowered, never raised.
5. Confirm the token. The real OSR ends in 01, has 18 decimals and a total supply of exactly 1,000,000,000.